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This paper analyses the strategic considerations that define the perceived need for 
transatlantic renewal, and examines the geo-economic impact of the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on both emerging powers and poorer 
countries. It argues that TTIP has the potential to be a catalyst for trade liberalisation 
at the global level, as long as the US and the EU are proactive about making the 
‘open architecture’ of TTIP a reality.  
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The Geostrategic Implications 
of TTIP 
Daniel Hamilton and Steven Blockmans* 
CEPS Special Report No. 105 / April 2015 
1. Introduction 
Much analysis has been conducted into the potential economic impact of TTIP, but little 
consideration has been given to its political and geostrategic implications. This paper builds 
on earlier research by the lead author and attempts to fill that gap.1 Our research has been 
guided by a number of questions: 
• Will TTIP strengthen or subvert the multilateral rules-based order? 
• How might such a partnership affect the broader debate about the so-called ‘decline of 
the West’? 
• Would a transatlantic economic partnership restore a sense of common purpose to the 
US-EU relationship, and in what way?  
• How might TTIP influence the way in which the US and the EU engage with other 
important actors, such as China, and the degree to which emerging powers choose to 
challenge the prevailing order, or accommodate themselves to it? 
• What geopolitical dynamics might be unleashed by the interaction among TTIP, the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and various EU bilateral trade negotiations with Asian 
countries? 
• How might a transatlantic economic partnership affect the EU’s Eastern Partnership 
countries, NAFTA partners Canada and Mexico, or NATO-ally Turkey? How might such 
a partnership affect each partner’s respective relations with Russia? 
• What might be the consequences of failure to reach a TTIP deal or the rejection of that 
deal by legislators or the general public on either side of the Atlantic? 
We set the scene by analysing the strategic considerations that define the (perceived) need 
for transatlantic renewal (section 2), and then discuss the geo-economic impact of TTIP on 
emerging powers (section 3) and poorer countries (section 4). We argue that TTIP has the 
potential to be a catalyst for trade liberalisation at the global level (section 5). In this context, 
we address the question of the openness of TTIP (section 6) and conclude with remarks on 
the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead (section 7). 
                                                     
* Daniel Hamilton is Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Professor and Executive Director of Johns 
Hopkins University’s Center for Transatlantic Relations, based at its School of Advanced International 
Studies in Washington D.C., Steven Blockmans is Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Europe in 
the World unit at CEPS. 
1
 See, e.g., the contributions to D. Hamilton (ed.), The Geopolitics of TTIP: Repositioning the Transatlantic 
Relationship for a Changing World (Washington, D.C., CTR, 2014), in particular the summary chapter by 
the editor, at vii-xxxii. 
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2. The Setting 
2.1 The perceived need for transatlantic renewal 
TTIP is not a new idea. Talks of an ambitious transatlantic deal stretch back over 20 years. 
Serious negotiations have never been launched, however, primarily because of concern for 
their potential impact on the multilateral trading system. Moreover, some critics have argued 
that such a deal would be “too small,” since transatlantic tariffs and other trade barriers have 
not been that consequential. Others have argued that such a deal would be “too big,” 
encompassing so many issues and with such reach into American and European societies 
that it would invite opposition by too many interest groups.2 
Both of these arguments have since waned. First, the Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations has been in stalemate for years. The recent and unexpected agreement on the so-
called ‘Bali Package’ at the WTO’s Ninth Ministerial Conference in December 2013 is an 
exception that proves the rule about the demise of global trade liberalisation: the package 
deal was reached with great difficulty but in July 2014 India decided against signing onto the 
trade facilitation protocol that was agreed upon as a key deliverable in Bali. It was only after 
the US and India came to a permanent agreement regarding India's food subsidies in 
November 2014 that the Bali Package received the final seal of approval. This saga shows 
that both the development spectrum and the appetite for liberalisation inside the WTO are 
rather variable. This is especially so in some of the more modern trade policy areas that are 
important to Washington and Brussels, such as competition frameworks, intellectual 
property protection and market access for financial services. As noted by former European 
Commissioner for Trade Peter Mandelson:  
“If GATT had been a club of self-described liberalisers, the WTO had become a club 
of guardians of the global trade rule book. For members who see global trade 
liberalisation as a work in progress the WTO can be a frustrating place to be, moving 
as it seems to do at the speed of the slowest of its members.”3 
Second, transatlantic tariffs may be low, but the size of the transatlantic economy is so huge 
that even small reductions could be more important than bigger tariff cuts in smaller 
markets, and tackling tariffs makes it easier to tackle regulatory differences, where even 
more substantial gains could be made. 
Third, TTIP is indeed a big negotiation. But deep integration between the US and EU 
economies means that greater alignment and coherence on issues ranging from services and 
investment to regulatory differences could do far more to generate jobs and economic 
growth than a narrow focus on trade alone. This is especially so in areas like automotive and 
pharmaceuticals, where regulation is essentially science-based and the desired outcomes are 
basically the same on both sides of the Atlantic. Also, the value of agreeing better regulatory 
                                                     
2 See C. Ries, “The Strategic Significance of TTIP”, in Hamilton (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1-11. 
3 P. Mandelson, “TTIP - what to play for?”, keynote address, Caplin Conference on the World 
Economy, University of Edinburgh, 2 May 2014. 
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process frameworks (i.e. identical standards for regulatory consultation, impact assessments 
and other forms of transparency) should not be underestimated.4 
The backdrop to the negotiation is a widely held perception that support for the multilateral 
institutions and the post-WWII principles on which they rest is eroding. This is due in part to 
ambivalence among rising powers about the nature of the international order, including a 
sense among some political elites in those countries that their moment in history has come 
(back) and that models other than those promoted by the US and the EU may be more 
relevant to future growth and prosperity. The creation of a BRICS Development Bank and 
the Chinese-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank are cases in point. 
The need felt on both shores of the pond to strengthen the transatlantic partnership is fuelled 
by the fear that perceptions of a weakened ‘West’– Europe afflicted by the worst economic 
and financial crisis since the Great Depression and the US unwilling to police crucial 
hotspots of the world – will take hold and lead to more robust challenges to the international 
financial institutions and security arrangements that have traditionally been controlled by 
the US and Europe. China's pinpricks in the East and South China Seas could indeed be seen 
as attempts to undermine American maritime dominance in Asia-Pacific, just as Russia's 
aggression in Ukraine is a direct challenge to the EU and NATO. 
In short, TTIP reflects a new transatlantic consensus that the international order inspired and 
supported by the transatlantic alliance is fading fast, and that Americans and Europeans 
must work together more urgently to build a partnership that is more effective in generating 
economic opportunity at home, dealing with new competitors, especially in emerging 
growth markets, and shoring up basic norms and principles guiding the international 
system.  
2.2 The economic dimension 
The transatlantic economy generates $5 trillion in total commercial sales a year and employs 
up to 15 million workers. It is the largest and wealthiest marketplace in the world, 
accounting for three-quarters of global financial markets and over half of world trade. It 
accounts for over 50% of world GDP in terms of value and 40% in terms of purchasing 
power. No other commercial artery is as integrated. Nonetheless, much more can be done to 
lower tariff and non-tariff barriers, kick-start services and investment and tackle unnecessary 
and costly regulatory differences.5 
TTIP is first and foremost an economic negotiation seeking agreement in three areas. The 
first addresses such market access issues as tariffs and rules of origin. The second seeks to 
reduce, where feasible, non-tariff barriers and to find coherence, convergence or recognition 
of essential equivalence on regulatory issues. The third area seeks common agreement on a 
range of norms and standards regarding such issues as investment, intellectual property 
rights, discriminatory industrial policies and state-owned enterprises. Some of these 
                                                     
4 See P. Chase & J. Pelkmans, “This time is different – regulatory cooperation in TTIP” (working title), 
forthcoming on CEPS and CTR websites in April 2015. 
5 For more on jobs, trade and investment between both sides of the North Atlantic, see D. Hamilton 
and J. Quinlan, “The Transatlantic Economy 2015: Annual Survey of Jobs, Trade and Investment 
between the United States and Europe” (Washington, D.C., CTR, 2015). 
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standards are likely to extend prevailing WTO standards (WTO+); others could go beyond 
existing multilateral norms (WTO-extra). 
In addition, the TTIP will not necessarily be concluded with a final document. TTIP is 
essentially a process whereby negotiators seek a ‘living agreement’ consisting of new 
consultative mechanisms regarding regulatory and non-tariff issues as they evolve in 
response to developments in trade, technology or other changes. Taken together, these 
elements underscore that TTIP is not just another trade agreement, it is a new-generation 
negotiation aimed at repositioning the US and European economies for a more diffuse world 
of intensified global competition. 
TTIP’s economic impact depends upon the final nature of any arrangement.6 Its importance 
will be a function of the depth and content of the binding commitments and rules achieved, 
particularly whether or not it is seriously a WTO+ agreement. If TTIP eliminates or reduces 
most transatlantic tariffs; lowers barriers to the services economy; aligns or reduces 
inefficiencies in regulatory discrepancies; and ensures continued high standards in such 
areas as labour, consumer, safety and health and environment, then it is likely to boost jobs 
and growth significantly on both sides of the Atlantic.  
2.3 Strategic considerations 
TTIP is about more than just trade. It is about creating a more strategic, dynamic and holistic 
US-EU relationship that is better positioned with regard to third countries to open markets 
and to strengthen the ground rules of the international order.  
TTIP is politically important to the US-EU relationship itself. The bilateral relationship 
encompasses a diffuse array of issues, but many are mired in process without overarching 
purpose. Revelations of National Security Agency (NSA) spying have also polluted the 
political environment in which the transatlantic partners confront global challenges and 
opportunities. The transatlantic engine is sputtering and needs some fuel. TTIP offers a 
framework for a concrete set of ambitious objectives to forge a more global partnership. It is 
the first real transatlantic initiative for the ‘post-post’ Cold War world and would be the first 
congressionally ratified agreement between the United States and the European Union. It 
could give the US-EU relationship new life, new focus, and new direction. 
In this sense TTIP could be both a symbolic and practical assertion of transatlantic renewal, 
vigour and commitment, not only for the US and the EU towards each other but also to high 
rules-based standards and core principles of international order. It is an initiative that could 
be assertive without being aggressive: it challenges fashionable notions about a ‘weakened 
West,’ that are prevalent in the context of the ‘rise of the rest’. 
TTIP is rooted in a core truth: despite the rise of other powers the US and Europe remain the 
fulcrum of the world economy, each other’s most important and profitable market and 
source of onshore jobs, each other’s most important strategic partner, and still a potent force 
                                                     
6 For simulations, see F. Erixon and M. Bauer, “A Transatlantic Zero Agreement: Estimating the Gains 
from Transatlantic Free Trade in Goods”, ECIPE Occasional Paper No. 4/2010, Brussels, ECIPE 2010; 
and J. François et al., “Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment. An Economic 
Assessment”, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, 2013. Also L. Fontagne et al., 
“Transatlantic trade: whither partnership, which economic consequences?”, CEPII Policy Brief No. 12, 
Paris (www.cepii.fr).  
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in the multilateral system – when they work in concert. The US-EU relationship remains a 
foundational element of the global economy and the essential underpinning of a strong 
rules-based international order. Americans and Europeans literally cannot afford to neglect 
it. TTIP is evidence that the two partners are committed to open transatlantic markets, to 
strengthen global rules and leverage global growth.  
In this respect, TTIP could also be an operational reflection of basic values shared by 
democratic societies across the Atlantic, even if differences on specific values exist (e.g. 
GMOs). Surely, the values dimension should be extolled, not suppressed, for it is certain to 
have broader resonance. Revolutionary advances in communications technologies mean that 
governments are no longer able to control what information citizens receive. 
There is also a reassurance element to the TTIP. When plans about TTIP were unfolded, 
NATO was wobbly and many Europeans were worried that the US ‘pivot’ to Asia would 
translate into less US attention and commitment to Europe. While Russia’s shock to the 
European – even global – security order has given NATO a new lease on life in defence of its 
original mission, the bigger picture still reflects a strategic rebalancing of America’s military 
might towards Asia Pacific. In this context, TTIP is strategically important. The creation of 
what would essentially be an EU-US marketplace, together with a commitment to work 
together to advance shared (‘Western’) norms and standards, would offer reassurance that 
the EU is in fact America’s ‘partner of choice’ and that the pivot to Asia is not a pivot away 
from Europe. To be sure, TTIP will not be an ‘economic NATO’7 – a term that can easily be 
misinterpreted – but it could be what former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called a 
“second anchor” for the transatlantic relationship, rooted in the deep and growing 
integration of our economies and societies. 
TTIP is also important to each partner’s own goals for itself. A successful agreement could 
help lessen America’s political polarisation and generate significant economic opportunities. 
If TTIP and TPP are successful, the US and its partners will have opened trade and 
investment across both the Atlantic and the Pacific with countries accounting for two-thirds 
of global output. As the only party to both initiatives, the negotiations give the US a distinct 
advantage in leveraging issues in one forum to advance its interests in the other, while 
potentially reinvigorating US global leadership. TTIP is also important to generate growth 
and jobs in EU member states, to win greater popular support for the European Union, 
particularly in members like the United Kingdom, and to spur implementation of some of 
the EU’s own goals, such as completion of the Single Market.  TTIP is important for the EU – 
its member states and institutions alike – to off-set its relative decline on the global stage.8 
The rise of the US as a global energy power has given the TTIP negotiations added 
importance. Energy-dependent European allies, particularly in Eastern Europe, as well as 
energy-dependent Pacific partners such as Japan are looking to the US as a new energy 
source. US law, however, currently limits natural gas exports to countries with which the 
United States has a free trade agreement. This gives some partners considerable motivation 
to move quickly to such an agreement with the US. A surge in transatlantic energy trade 
                                                     
7 Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Conference “A New Era for EU-
US Trade”, Confederation of Danish Industry, Copenhagen, 7 October 2013. 
8 See D. Gros and C. Alcidi (eds), “The Global Economy in 2030: Trends and Strategies for Europe”, 
CEPS, Brussels, 2013. 
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would generate even greater benefits for both sides of the Atlantic than most calculations 
have shown. 
For all these reasons – much as war is too important to be left to generals – TTIP is too 
important to be left to economists. The foreign policy community has a fiduciary 
responsibility for the success of TTIP, which could offer new glue for the transatlantic 
relationship. 
3. Geo-economics: Impact on Rising Powers 
America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan revealed the limits of military might. In spite of 
Russia’s sabre-rattling in the neighbourhood it shares with the EU, and the turmoil in the 
Middle East, today’s great political games revolve mostly around another dimension of 
power: geo-economics. The rise of China is central to this story. 
There are four sets of big international negotiations under way: TTIP, TPP, EU efforts to 
forge bilateral deals with India and Japan, and US-EU led talks between more than 20 
advanced and rising economies to liberalise trade in services (the Trade in Services 
Agreement, TiSA). Pull the strands together and – despite rhetoric to the contrary – the 
message is that the US and the EU have given up on the grand multilateralism that defined 
the post-World War II era and are repositioning themselves for the world of tomorrow. The 
outcomes of all four sets of negotiations promise to draw the geo-economic contours of the 
globalised world, fix the point of balance between advanced and rising states, and 
circumscribe China’s place in the world. They will decide what can be salvaged from the 
present multilateral system. The choice lies between open global arrangements and an 
economic order built around competing blocs. 
TTIP is important in terms of how the transatlantic partners together might best relate to 
rising powers, especially the emerging growth markets. Whether those powers choose to 
challenge the current international order and its rules or promote themselves within it 
depends largely on how the US and the EU engage, not only with them but also with each 
other.9 The stronger the bonds among core democratic market economies, the better their 
chances of being able to include rising partners as responsible stakeholders in the 
international system. The more united, integrated, interconnected and dynamic the 
international liberal order is – shaped in large part by the US and the EU – the greater the 
likelihood that emerging powers will rise within this order and adhere to its rules. The looser 
or weaker those bonds are, the greater the likelihood that rising powers will challenge this 
order. Thus, the US and the EU have an interest in protecting and reinforcing the 
institutional foundations of the liberal order, beginning with their own partnership and 
extending it to the WTO. This means not only refraining from imposing such national 
protectionist measures as trade tariffs, export subsidies or 'buy national' policies, but 
coordinating efforts to ensure high standards globally that can lift the lives of their own 
people and create economic opportunity for billions of others around the globe. 
                                                     
9 See S. Eizenstat, “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Remarks”, Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., 21 March 2013 
(www.acus.org/files/transcripts/seizenstat130321wilsonremarks.pdf). 
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There are already signs that TTIP is affecting third countries. TTIP was ‘the elephant in the 
room’ at the 2013 EU-Brazil summit; it is causing Brazilian leaders to reframe how they think 
of their evolving role and position.10 Japan’s decision to join the TPP was due as much to the 
start of TTIP negotiations as to intra-Asian dynamics. With the EU now also negotiating a 
bilateral trade agreement with Japan, both the US and the EU are in direct talks with Tokyo 
about opening the Japanese market – a goal that for decades has seemed unattainable. There 
is also reason to believe that the trade facilitation deal struck by WTO members in Bali in 
December 2013 was due in part to concern from various holdout countries that with the TTIP 
and TPP the global trading system was moving ahead without them. There is no denying 
that TTIP and related initiatives are injecting new impetus into efforts to open markets and 
strengthen global rules.11 
China has woken up to fact that it is being left behind in today’s most important sets of trade 
negotiations. China has long sought to translate its economic clout into military influence 
(e.g. in the South China Sea) or into diplomatic and political influence (e.g. by holding down 
the value of its currency to boost its companies), but Beijing has changed its position and 
signalled a willingness to join plurilateral talks on services (TiSA) and has suggested that 
negotiations with the EU on investment rules could be followed by the negotiation of a trade 
pact. The responses from Washington and Brussels have been distinctly lukewarm. The US 
and the EU want evidence that Beijing is ready to open up its economy. China has been the 
big winner from the open global economy but is seen as a free-rider on the multilateral 
system. The US is asking why it should further expand arrangements that empower its rival. 
The US response to China’s rise has long been to engage and hedge – to draw Beijing into a 
rules-based system while refurbishing old alliances as an insurance policy. The emphasis 
now is on hedging. 
TTIP is a values-based, rules-based initiative that is likely to strengthen international 
solidarity and cohesion, facilitate US energy exports to Europe, and enhance the 
attractiveness of the transatlantic model of liberal democratic economies. All this is anathema 
to the current leadership in the Kremlin.12 Russia is engaged in a bidding war with the EU 
over the shared neighbourhood. Realising that the promise of accession to the future 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) does not exert enough power of attraction,13 the Kremlin 
has been using military and economic coercion in an effort to drive a wedge between the EU 
and countries like Armenia (which caved in and joined the EEU on 2 January 2015), Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia. Although the European Commission has initiated proceedings before 
the dispute settlement body DSB against Russia for its alleged infringement of WTO rules 
under four separate counts, the EU’s overall pushback on Russia's actions has been weak, 
which reinforces views in eastern Europe that TTIP could offer advantages that a multilateral 
                                                     
10 See, e.g., V. Thorstensen and L. Ferraz, “The Impact of TTIP on Brazil”, in Hamilton (ed.), op. cit., 
pp. 137-149. 
11 As noted above, India eventually made good on its change of heart (i.e. not signing the TFA in July 
2014) by agreeing in November 2014 with the US on its food security and public stockholding 
concerns. 
12 See E. Lucas, “TTIP, Central and Eastern Europe, and Russia”, in Hamilton (ed.), op. cit., pp. 49-56. 
13 See S. Blockmans, H. Kostanyan and I. Vorobiov, “Towards a Eurasian Economic Union: The 
Challenge of Integration and Unity”, CEPS Special Report No. 75, Brussels, December 2012. 
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framework might not.14 Meanwhile, the Kremlin is reported to be conducting active 
measures in Eastern Partnership countries and in the EU itself to foment opposition to the 
TTIP.15 
The risks of fragmentation of international trading rules are obvious enough. A positive sum 
can quite quickly become a zero sum game, carrying the unfortunate flavour of a contest 
between “the West and the rest”. Sidelining China would carry threats to the existing fabric 
of the global system; and history throws up some ugly examples of how disputes about trade 
are the precursor to more serious conflict. 
4. Addressing Concerns of Poorer Countries 
A related consideration has to do with how the United States and the EU approach poorer 
countries. Much depends on the way the US and the EU handle the multiple trade 
agreements that each has with third countries and regions. The two parties would do well to 
send a clear signal that the TTIP is about common efforts to open markets by harmonising 
their current hodgepodge of trade preference mechanisms for low-income African countries. 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region in the world, accounts for a minuscule 2% of world 
trade. This marginalisation of the region is holding back its development at a time when its 
economic governance is rapidly improving. Sub-Saharan Africa needs generous access to 
developed consumer markets to spur investment in labour-intensive export sectors that can 
spark growth and contribute to its successful economic transformation.16 
Both the United States and the European Union give trade preferences for (some) products 
from (some) countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The EU provides duty-free and quota-free 
access to its markets for all products – but only to the 27 least-developed countries in the 
region. It also offers less generous access to former colonies through preferential deals. The 
US scheme benefits 40 of the 48 countries in the region, but excludes key agricultural 
products (such as cotton) that African countries can produce competitively. These schemes 
may look good on paper, but they are actually underutilised because of their administrative 
complexity and outdated rules. Local content requirements are too high, and the rules of 
origin required for product eligibility were created decades before the development of 
today’s value chains, which involve many countries specialising in fragmented tasks. 
Moreover, the US and the EU use different methods to define origin, forcing exporters to 
cope with a myriad of rules.17 
It will be difficult to justify or implement a North Atlantic deal in which the participants 
have differing rules for developing countries. What foreign policy interest is served, for 
example, if the EU and the US provide different access to Kenya’s products? In addition, 
once TTIP is in place it will make no sense to have differing access arrangements for 
                                                     
14 See D. Hamilton, “Transatlantic Challenges: Ukraine, TTIP and the Struggle to be Strategic”, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 2014, pp. 1–15. See also T. Novák, “TTIP’s Implications for the Global 
Economic Integration of Central and Eastern Europe”, in Hamilton (ed.), op. cit., pp. 57-70. 
15 See Lucas, op. cit. 
16 See, e.g., E. Herfkens, “TTIP and Sub-Saharan Africa: A Proposal to Harmonize EU and U.S. 
Preferences”, in Hamilton (ed.), op. cit., pp. 151-166. 
17 Ibid. 
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companies from third countries. The United States and the European Union could gain 
considerable political advantage while following through on the logical consequence of their 
own negotiations if they were to harmonise their trade preference schemes for sub-Saharan 
Africa, either as part of or as a complement to their partnership pact.  
The scheme should cover all products, since excluding just a few could encompass most 
products that these countries can produce competitively. Rules of origin need to be relevant, 
simple and flexible for beneficiaries to be able to use the schemes and benefit from the 
growth of value chains. Such value chains have virtually bypassed the Sub-Saharan region so 
far, but they hold considerable potential for less-developed African countries. It is much 
easier for these countries to develop capabilities in a narrow range of tasks (e.g. at the low 
end of global value chains such as simple assembly, as long as infrastructure is sufficient to 
attract FDI) than in integrated production of entire products or processes.  
Updating these rules to the realities of 21st century production networks is long overdue. 
WTO negotiations on clarifying rules of origin are likely to take decades; the US and the EU 
could do something together now. As an interim solution the European Union and the 
United States could recognise each other’s product origin regime. If an import is eligible for 
preferential treatment in the US, it should also be eligible in the EU, and vice versa. By doing 
so, the US and the EU would also demonstrate that TTIP is about opening markets rather 
than diverting trade. This is admittedly very tough politically, given protectionist measures 
in both the US and the EU. But the logic of an ever-closer transatlantic market will raise this 
question sooner or later. If the US and the EU address the issue sooner, they gain some 
additional political advantages. If they address it later, those advantages disappear and 
domestic political infighting over the removal of cotton subsidies in the US, for instance, is 
likely to grow. 
5. TTIP and Multilateralism 
Europeans and Americans share an interest in extending prosperity through multilateral 
trade liberalisation. The December 2013 Bali agreement on trade facilitation is a sign that 
piecemeal progress can be made. But the overall Doha Round has been underway for over 13 
years with no agreement in sight, and the WTO system is under challenge, especially from 
emerging growth markets that have benefited substantially from the system. A number of 
rapidly emerging countries do not necessarily share the core principles or basic structures 
that underpin open rules-based commerce and show little interest in new market-opening 
initiatives. As a result, the global economy is drifting dangerously towards the use of 
national discriminatory trade, regulatory and investment practices. 
In this regard, TTIP could indeed represent a new form of transatlantic collaboration to 
strengthen multilateral rules and lift international norms. Given the size and scope of the 
transatlantic economy, standards negotiated by the US and EU could become a benchmark 
for future global rules, reducing the likelihood that others will impose more stringent, 
protectionist requirements for either products or services. Mutual recognition of essentially 
equivalent norms and regulatory coherence across the transatlantic space, in areas ranging 
from consumer safety and intellectual property to investment policy and labour mobility, not 
only promise economic benefits at home but could also form the core of broader 
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international norms and standards.18 TTIP’s first market access pillar could result in clearer, 
more straightforward and transparent rules of origin arrangements that could serve as the 
basis for future preferential rules of origin – a common public good. In many cases, the 
standards being negotiated are intended to be more rigorous than comparable rules found in 
the WTO. Agreement on such issues as intellectual property, discriminatory industrial 
policies or state-owned enterprises could strengthen the normative underpinnings of the 
multilateral system by creating benchmarks for possible multilateral liberalisation under the 
WTO.  
There is a precedent for this. When the Uruguay Round stalled in the early 1990s, the US, 
Canada and Mexico negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement in just 14 months 
in 1992; it came into force in 1994. This plurilateral effort had a catalytic effect on the 
multilateral system;19 the Uruguay Round restarted and concluded successfully. The 
Information Technology Agreement negotiated by the US and EU also eventually became the 
basic multilateral agreement in this area. With the Doha Round stalled, we may again be at a 
point where plurilateral initiatives could ultimately re-energise the multilateral system. TTIP 
may spur others to come back to the Doha table. 
TTIP may be useful not only to shore up the multilateral system but to extend it to new areas 
and new members. Even a successful Doha Round agreement would not address a host of 
issues that were not part of its mandate and yet are critical to the transatlantic partners and 
the global economy. Transatlantic initiatives in investment or clean technologies, for 
example, could be extended to WTO members who are willing to take up the same 
responsibilities and obligations covered by such agreements.  
Hence, the ‘multilateral vs. transatlantic’ dichotomy is a false choice. The US and EU should 
advance on both fronts simultaneously; push multilateral liberalisation while pioneering 
transatlantic market-opening initiatives in areas not yet covered by multilateral agreements. 
The alternative to this WTO+ agenda is not drift; it is growing protectionism, US-EU rivalry 
in third markets, and the triumph of lowest-common-denominator standards for the health 
and safety of our people. The absence of agreed rules and procedures weakens the leverage 
of our two regions to ensure that high standards prevail.  
In this regard, those who worry that TTIP could threaten the multilateral economic system 
should consider that the opposite may in fact be true. Although the notion of an ambitious 
transatlantic compact has been discussed for two decades, the US and EU refrained from 
going ahead, and yet the Doha Round still didn’t work. TTIP could be a laboratory for the 
WTO and a vanguard for the rest of the world.   
TTIP is not just about regulatory coherence across the Atlantic, it is about setting global 
benchmarks. In this regard it is more ambitious than the TPP. In fact, a successful TTIP 
would actually be a TPP+ agreement with regard to regulatory coherence. TTIP is likely to 
have more impact on Asian economies than TPP is likely to have on European economies. 
                                                     
18 See Chase and Pelkmans, op.  cit. 
19 Other developments were also significant to moving the Uruguay Round forward, such as the 
deepening and widening of economic cooperation between European Community member states 
(1992) and the effect this had on the states belonging to the European Free Trade Association. In 1994, 
the EC and EFTA states joined the newly created European Economic Area. 
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There are still some concerns, however. Political energy is finite, and mega-regional deals 
could take the oxygen out of multilateral efforts.20 Also, the values argument loses some of 
its punch if TTIP is perceived to be about trade diversion rather than trade creation. TTIP 
could spur multilateral liberalisation, but only if and when other states go along with the 
transatlantic agreement and if no great trading powers work against it. In fact, much may 
depend on the outcome of the two other sets of negotiations promising to test allegiance to 
multilateralism. One will decide whether it is possible to secure a global accord on climate 
change (COP 21 in Paris in December 2015); the other whether rich nations are ready to 
extend help to poorer nations enshrined in the soon-to-expire 2015 Millennium Development 
Goals. The debates in both cases centre on rights and responsibilities. How to share out the 
burden of cutting carbon emissions; how much should rich countries pay for development? 
Should their largesse be matched by greater responsibility on the part of the recipients? Do 
governments from north and south, or west and east have the political will and energy to 
recognise their mutual interest in new multilateral agreements? While modest progress has 
been made (e.g. with the December 2014 Lima Call for Climate Action), success on both 
multilateral tracks remains elusive. Governments elsewhere pay lip service to the facts of 
interdependence while jealously guarding outdated notions of national sovereignty. 
Enlightened self-interest is an approach lost on most of today’s world leaders. Then again, 
globalisation without global rules may work for a while, but it may not last. 
In short, while multilateral agreement is preferable, it is not currently available. TTIP 
represents a very significant second-best option. However, a weak element to the TTIP thus 
far relates to openness. 
6. The Issue of Openness 
Governments have not stated whether and how TTIP, once concluded, might be open to 
others willing and able to commit to similar goals and ground rules. United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) Mike Froman has characterised TTIP as an “open platform” but the 
two parties have made no official statement to this effect.21 This stands in contrast to the TPP, 
where the United States and its negotiating partners have stated explicitly that the TPP is 
open to other APEC members (including China and Russia) and in principle much of the 
Asia-Pacific region.22 
Framing the TTIP as an element of ‘open architecture’ accessible to others could give the US 
and the EU tremendous leverage in terms of ensuring ever broader commitment to the high 
standards and basic principles governing modern open economies, much as NATO and EU 
enlargement gave them significant leverage over transitional democracies in Central and 
Eastern Europe. One reason why many Turks are interested in TTIP, for instance, is that it 
represents a “transatlantic form of governance” as opposed to other models, and is thus 
                                                     
20 See T. Straubhaar, “TTIP: Don’t Lose Momentum!”, in Hamilton (ed.), op. cit., pp. 33-48. 
21 Remarks by Ambassador Michael Froman at the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Strategic Logic 
of Trade”, New York, 16 June 2014. The transcript is available at www.cfr.org/trade/us-trade-
negotiations-aim-raise-labor-environmental-standards/p33141.  
22 TPP Leaders’ Statement, Honolulu, 12 November 2011 (www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-
Declarations/2011/2011_aelm.aspx).  
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important as a means to influence Turkey’s own modernisation.23 Yet the US and EU have 
not been clear about whether Turkey could in fact accede at some point. Turkey has a 
Customs Union with the EU, but nothing similar with the US, which means that under a 
TTIP US goods could flow via the EU onto the Turkish market without Turkish engagement 
on the terms. NAFTA countries Canada and Mexico face similar issues, as do EFTA states 
such as Switzerland, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. The issue of ‘open architecture’ is 
also likely to have great resonance for Eastern Partnership countries like Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine, with which the EU has recently concluded deep and comprehensive free trade 
arrangements, integral to their Association Agreements. As noted above, it is also likely to 
influence countries such as Brazil and other emerging economies.  
The US and the EU could issue a leaders’ statement that TTIP is part of an open architecture 
of trade. The leaders’ statement could also announce that the two parties are initiating 
consultative/information mechanisms for third parties potentially affected by a final 
agreement, recognising that some of this is already under way. Once such a statement is 
made, further internal work should be done to make it operational. The underlying premise 
is that the TTIP package would be opened only once it has been negotiated. On this basis, 
various options may be worth exploring. One would be straightforward accession: countries 
that are willing and able to meet the same high standards as negotiated could accede to the 
agreement. There may be an option to open individual elements to others, for instance 
market access or signing on to basic investment principles. This option would recognise that 
there are likely to be limits as to how open TTIP can be. For instance, it will be difficult 
simply to open some regulatory arrangements that might emerge from TTIP, or to open the 
‘living agreement’ aspect of a TTIP process, because such elements are likely to be based on 
the trust and confidence generated among US and EU regulators, legislators and certifiers. 
But countries may be able to join or attach themselves to certain provisions. For instance, 
when the US and the EU finalised their Open Skies agreement on transatlantic air transport 
in 2007, legal texts were created enabling a range of additional countries, not only in Europe 
but in other parts of the world, to also implement provisions of the agreement through 
separate accords.24 Another option would be for the US and the EU to negotiate new or 
additional WTO-compatible agreements. There is some precedent for this option. For 
instance, since Chile could not accede to NAFTA, the US negotiated a separate bilateral 
arrangement. The latter option may convince true multilateralists that TTIP should not be 
seen as an alternative to WTO frameworks but rather as a catalyst in reforming them by 
‘uploading’ key aspects of TTIP onto the multilateral plane. Such an approach would do 
justice to the twin-track approach advocated above. 
Whatever modalities are chosen, once the agreement is concluded the two parties should be 
proactive about making the ‘open architecture’ of TTIP a reality.  
                                                     
23 See, e.g., K. Kirişci, “TTIP and Turkey: The Geopolitical Dimension”, in Hamilton (ed.), op. cit., pp. 
71-95. 
24 For instance, a Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Agreement between the European Union and Israel 
was signed on 10 June 2013, published in the Official Journal of the EU, 2013 L 208/3. 
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7. Concluding Remarks  
There should be no illusions about the difficulties involved in achieving a TTIP. Remaining 
transatlantic tariff barriers, especially in agriculture, often reflect the most politically difficult 
cases. Some of the most intense transatlantic disagreements have arisen over differences in 
regulatory policy. Issues such as food safety or environmental standards have strong public 
constituencies and are often extremely sensitive in the domestic political arena. There is 
considerable debate about how and whether to include financial services and energy. For the 
EU, TTIP will really only be worth its salt if export barriers to energy products are lifted. Yet 
it is questionable whether either side is prepared to gore its sacred cows on the TTIP altar – 
audiovisual for the EU, the Jones Act25 for the United States. Defence trade is off-limits. To 
complicate matters further, responsibility for regulation in the EU is split between Brussels 
and member states, and in the US between federal and state governments. 
Investor state dispute settlement mechanisms envisaged under TTIP could present the 
biggest risk of all. Some view the issue as a self-inflicted wound, offering little gain at great 
pain. Investment flows freely across the Atlantic; few potential investors are deterred due to 
fear of arbitrary, discriminatory court action or regulatory takings. Yet the issue has awoken 
an unholy alliance of sovereigntists and populists on both sides of the Atlantic. Others argue 
that the investor state issue goes to the heart of TTIP’s role as a regulatory pace-setter and 
that it is essential to a ground-breaking agreement.26   
This list of difficult issues has raised concern that TTIP could divide rather than unite 
Europeans and Americans. The regulatory elements in particular have elicited a generalised 
concern in the EU that TTIP could enable the American ‘system’ to steamroll the European 
way of life. GMO issues feed these fears, even though GMOs are not part of the negotiations; 
NSA revelations offer further nourishment.   
Both US and EU officials have been clear that TTIP will not undermine existing levels of 
protection. It will reinforce each side’s right to regulate, but now informed by common 
consultations and a process that should create greater trust and confidence in each other’s 
regulatory processes and decisions. Yet this message has not really come through. Part of the 
problem is that TTIP costs can be translated into negative, personalised anecdotes, whereas 
TTIP benefits are more abstract and broad. Arguably, US and European officials could do 
more to raise awareness with average citizens about the benefits of TTIP.27 
These concerns and uncertainties underscore the importance of managing expectations while 
building a more energetic and effective outreach effort to both public and elite audiences. 
Such strategies should convey not only what TTIP is, but what it is not. It is not the first step 
                                                     
25 The Jones Act, formally the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, was “a statute announcing the 
intention of the United States government to ‘withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands 
as soon as a stable government can be established therein.’” 
(www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/306000/Jones-Act). 
26 See the debate between L. Poulsen, J. Bonnitcha and J. Yackee, “Transatlantic Investment Treaty 
Protection”, CEPS Special Report No. 102, Brussels [also on the CTR website]; and F. Baetens, 
“Transatlantic Investment Treaty Protection – A Response to Poulsen, Bonnitcha and Yackee”, CEPS 
Special Report No. 103, Brussels, March 2015 [also on the CTR website].  
27 The European Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström has been particularly active in this area 
since she assumed her new position in November 2014. 
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towards, or justified by, ‘globalisation.’ It isn’t a supranational regime and it poses no threat 
to the American or European way of life. It is a means to generate jobs, open markets, and 
ensure high standards for the food we eat, the products we buy and the services we receive. 
Thus far both parties have signalled strong political commitment to a successful TTIP 
agreement. But as the going gets tough and other issues intrude, the open question remains 
whether both sides will consider that they need each other enough to make TTIP a priority 
and invest the necessary political capital to see the deal through to a successful ratification.  
Unanticipated third issues might also emerge that could damage or even scuttle the 
negotiations, for instance a British referendum rejecting EU membership; renewed economic 
crisis; an environmental disaster or a terrorist attack, among others. The most prominent 
issue is still the disclosure of extensive spying operations by the US National Security 
Agency against European allies and other governments, which has eroded mutual trust and 
confidence to such an extent (especially in Germany) that some in Europe have called for the 
EU to suspend various agreements with the United States and to halt TTIP negotiations.28 
Thus far European leaders have resisted such demands, as they know that TTIP is far more 
than just another trade agreement and that the EU has a great stake in a successful outcome 
to the negotiations. But the issue remains unresolved and may become a bone of contention 
with a more critical European Parliament. It is also unclear whether an ultimate TTIP deal 
will be considered a final agreement to be ratified only by the European Parliament, or a so-
called ‘mixed agreement’ to be ratified by all 28 EU member states as well, an issue that may 
run into trouble with Members of the US Congress who may find it difficult to explain to 
their constituents that the entry into force of the agreement might be upheld by a single 
disgruntled EU member state. 
USTR Mike Froman has committed negotiators to concluding an agreement on “a single tank 
of gas”, meaning before the end of President Obama’s term in office in early 2016. But the 
Administration has not yet secured Trade Promotion Authority for either the TPP or TTIP. 
Without it, each agreement would be subject to potentially debilitating congressional 
amendments. And the outcome of negotiations and a subsequent ratification debate would 
be even more uncertain if extended to a new President and Congress. 
TTIP is ambitious. It will be tough to conclude. But the potential payoff is high, and the 
geostrategic impact of such an agreement could be as profound as the direct economic 
benefits. Too much is at stake now for the initiative to fail. Either negotiators succeed or they 
must continue to work towards a successful outcome. If one tank of gas isn’t enough, then 
they should go to the filling station. 
                                                     
28 See German Marshall Fund, “Transatlantic Trends 2014” 
(http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/Trends_2014_complete.pdf). 
